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I. Introduction
The political question doctrine, once thought to have its proper
application in war and foreign policy or explicit constitutional conflicts, has 
taken center stage in a strange context: tort-based climate change litigation. 
* J.D. Candidate, 2011, University of California, Hastings College of the Law,
San Francisco, California; B.A., 2008, U.C. Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, California.  The 
author would like to thank Professor Kara Christenson for turning her attention to 
this important topic; Brent Newell of the Center on Race, Poverty and the 
Environment for the opportunity to work directly on the Kivalina appeal; Debby 
Cwalina Furth for her advice and guidance; and Christina Rodriguez for her support 
and encouragement.  The author dedicates this Note to her grandmother, Gloria 
Dodd. 
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Between 2005 and 2007, three district courts dismissed, in part on political 
question grounds, federal common law public nuisance suits for damages 
and/or injunctive relief for injuries allegedly caused as a result of climate 
change.  In Connecticut v. American Electric Power Company (“AEPC I”),1 the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the 
plaintiffs’ suit for injunctive relief to abate carbon dioxide (“CO2”) emissions 
by several utility and energy companies, holding that such litigation posed 
nonjusticiable political questions.  In California v. General Motors Company 
(“GMC”),2 the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
California dismissed plaintiff’s claims for damages against various 
automakers for their contributions to CO2 pollution and climate change on 
political question grounds similar to those as AEPC I.  In Comer v. Murphy Oil 
Company (Comer I),3 plaintiffs’ claims for damages against energy, fossil fuel 
and chemical companies for their contributions to climate change, which 
plaintiffs claim led to the increased strength of Hurricane Katrina and the 
subsequent destruction it caused, were also dismissed as nonjusticiable.   
In 2009, the AEPC I decision was reversed by the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals, holding that tort-based climate change litigation did not pose 
nonjusticiable political questions.4  Yet in that same year, subsequent to the 
AEPC II decision, the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
California dismissed the tort-based climate change litigation of Native Village 
of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil (Kivalina)5 on both standing and political question 
grounds.6  Kivalina, now pending appeal before the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, may predict whether the United States Supreme Court is forced to 
rectify a circuit court split, or whether Congress will be forced to act because 
of the increasing justiciability of tort-based climate change litigation.  Given 
the Second Circuit authority now in existence, this Note argues that tort-
based climate change litigation does not pose nonjusticiable political 
questions, and that the Ninth Circuit should follow the reasoning of the 
Second Circuit in reversing the district court decision in Kivalina. 
The purpose of this Note is to highlight the rapidly changing area of 
tort-based climate change law, particularly insofar as the political question 
doctrine is involved, and to proffer evidence in support of the Ninth Circuit 
should it choose to reverse the district court decision in Kivalina.  Part I of 
1. 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
2. 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
3. Transcript of Hearing on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, No. 1:05-CV-436-
LG-RHW (S.D. Miss. Aug 30, 2007). 
4. See Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2nd Cir. 2009).
5. 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
6. This Note will focus solely on the political question grounds in the
dismissal of Kivalina. 
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this Note will explain what the political question doctrine is and how it has 
developed as a legal doctrine and a check on the powers of the judiciary. 
This part will first address the historical background of the political question 
doctrine, and then detail its progression and scope within American 
jurisprudence.  Part II of this Note will address the political question 
doctrine in the context of tort-based climate change litigation.  This part will 
address the AEPC, Comer, and GMC litigation in turn, laying out the 
respective district court analyses with respect to the political question 
doctrine before discussing how the Second Circuit Court in AEPC II rejected 
the political question arguments.  Finally, Part III of this Note will address 
the Kivalina litigation.  This part will first lay out the district court’s reasoning 
in dismissing the case partly on political question grounds, and then will 
analyze the appellate briefs and discuss how the Ninth Circuit should 
handle the appeal.   
II. The Political Question Doctrine
The political question doctrine is one of the few “checks” on the
judicial branch of the United States government.  Its purpose lies in 
restricting the judiciary to hearing issues which are not otherwise under the 
purview of another branch of government, and for which the court can 
adequately find a remedy.7  Cases should be dismissed as nonjusticiable 
where the dispute at issue violates these purposes and should be settled 
through the political functions of the executive and legislative branches of 
government.8  This restraint on the judiciary is to some extent self-imposed, 
as a result of Marbury v. Madison (Marbury),9 to some extent mandated by the 
structure of government laid out in Articles I – III of the United States 
Constitution10 and to some extent a result of the developed “case or 
controversy” requirement for the judiciary stemming solely from Article III.11 
After briefly laying out the historical progression of the political 
question doctrine in American jurisprudence, this Note will address the 
7. See HERBERT WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW, 11-14
(1961); ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR 
OF POLITICS, 125-26 (1986). 
8. Kimberly Breedon, Remedial Problems at the Intersection of the Political Question
Doctrine, the Standing Doctrine, and the Doctrine of Equitable Discretion, 34 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 
523 (2008) (hereinafter Breedon); see also LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS, 284 (2d ed. 
2003). 
9. 5 U.S. 137, 170 (1803).
10. U.S. Const. arts. I-III.
11. Id.; see also Trevor Cutaiar, Lane ex rel. Lane v. Halliburton: The Fifth Circuit’s
Recent Treatment of the Political Question Doctrine and What it Could Mean for Comer v. 
Murphy Oil, 55 LOY. L. REV. 393 (2009) (hereinafter Cutaiar). 
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most well-known political question case, Baker v. Carr (Baker),12 and the 
perceived scope of the political question doctrine.  In particular, those 
opinions that support the idea of a limited scope and use of the political 
questions doctrine as a means for dismissing cases before getting to their 
merits will be highlighted. 
A. Marbury v. Madison and the Classical/Prudential Divide
In Marbury v. Madison, the Court sought to resolve a dispute over a 
commission promised to Marbury to serve as a justice of the peace but 
withheld from him after a change in presidential administration.13  In writing 
the opinion for the Court, Chief Justice John Marshall distinguished between 
individual issues and rights on the one hand, and national issues on the 
other.14  Chief Justice Marshall stated that “[q]uestions, in their nature 
political [by virtue of pertaining to the nation and not individual rights],15 or 
which are, by the [C]onstitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can 
never be made in this [C]ourt.”16  The structure the Court was espousing was 
one where claims invoking individual rights and not challenging decisions 
made by the other branches under their discretionary functions are not 
political and are thereby justiciable.17  As Chief Justice Marshall saw it, “[t]he 
province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to 
enquire [sic] how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in 
which they have a discretion.”18  This limited structure, inspired by and 
consistent with the principles of separation of powers inherent in the 
Constitution, constitutes the genesis of the political question doctrine.19 
Whatever else Chief Justice Marshall accomplished in Marbury, he 
failed to lay out guidelines for applying the concept of the political question 
to other cases.  Courts following the Marbury decision had very little to go on 
in determining whether a case invoked the political question doctrine.  As a 
result, scholars have identified two distinct strands of the political question 
doctrine that have developed: the classical and the prudential.20  The 
12. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
13. 5 U.S. at 140.
14. Id. at 166.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 170.
17. Breedon, supra note 8, at 527.
18. 5 U.S. at 170.
19. See U.S. Const. arts I-III; Cutaiar, supra note 11, at 398.
20. See Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court?  The Fall of the Political
Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237 (2002) 
(hereinafter Barkow). 
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classical strand has its “foundation in the text, structure, and history of the 
Constitution itself,” much like Chief Justice Marshall’s formulation in 
Marbury.21   
The prudential strand, on the other hand, does not involve 
constitutional interpretation but rather is a judge-made overlay used to 
avoid conflicts with the other branches and to avoid embarrassment.22  
Courts have used this prudential strand of the doctrine “to delegate judicial 
authority to political actors (even when the Constitution does not 
contemplate such a delegation) and to avoid deciding controversial cases.”23  
This prudential strand grew largely out of the interpretative vacuum left after 
Marbury,24  and it often involves courts looking not to the text of the 
Constitution itself, but rather to the consequences of the case in 
contemplating whether a political question exists.25  With the rise of the 
prudential political question doctrine comes the fear that a court may 
“[avoid] a case simply because it believes the issue is too complicated or 
too politically charged.”26  
B. The Scope of the Political Question Doctrine
The Court failed to lay out a more detailed structure for the case or 
controversy requirement until Baker v. Carr in 1962.27  In Baker, the Court held 
that a political question will be found if any one of the following factors is 
present in a case: 
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;
or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4]
the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches of
government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence
to a political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of
21. Id. at 253.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 258.
25. Id.; see, e.g., Cutaiar, supra note 11, at 399.
26. Id. at 263.
27. Baker, 369 U.S. at 186.
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embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various 
departments on one question.28 
Notably, the Baker factors take into account both the classical and the 
prudential strands of the political question doctrine.29  The first two factors 
are grounded in the text of the Constitution and the duties of the judiciary, 
thereby recognizing the classical strand.30  The other four factors are largely 
based in the discretion of the courts and the context of the cases themselves 
rather than constitutional text, and therefore recognize the prudential 
strand.31 
The Baker factors, by themselves, provide clearer but still incomplete 
information as to the scope of the political question doctrine.  The Court in 
Baker appears, however, to have envisioned a narrowed scope for the 
doctrine.32  The Court stated that it is separation of powers concerns, not 
merely political undertones, which give rise to a political question.33  The 
Court distinguished between cases which pose actual political questions 
and those that are political cases as a whole, and made clear that only the 
former are nonjusticiable.34   
This distinction between political cases and political questions has 
been echoed in other cases as well.  In Japan Whaling Association v. American 
Cetacean Society (Japan Whaling), for example, the Court rejected the Japan 
Whaling Association’s claim that the sixth Baker factor was invoked because 
the issues involved foreign relations and an international agreement.35  The 
case involved a claim by environmental groups that the Japan Whaling 
Association had violated the International Convention for the Regulation of 
Whaling.36  The Court held that statutory interpretation is a judicial function 
and that it was unable to “shirk this responsibility merely because [the] 
decision may have significant political overtones.”37   
In Powell v. McCormack, the Court again struck down a political question 
defense.38  There, the House of Representatives refused to seat the newly 
28. Id. at 217.
29. Barkow, supra note 20, at 265.
30. Id.; see e.g. Cutaiar, supra note 11, at 401.
31. Id.
32. See Breedon, supra note 8, at 528.
33. Baker, 369 U.S. at 210.
34. Id. at 210-11; see e.g. Breedon, supra note 8, at 529.
35. 478 U.S. 221, 229 (1986).
36. Id. at 224.
37. Id. at 229-30.
38. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
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elected Powell for lack of qualification.39  The defendant Speaker of the 
House claimed that, because determining qualifications of Representatives 
was textually committed to the House by the Constitution, this was a 
political question.40  The Court disagreed, stating that there was only a 
textual commitment to the House to judge certain specifically expressed 
qualifications, not all.41  The Court noted, importantly for the purpose of this 
Note, that “[our] government requires that federal courts on occasion 
interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance with the construction 
given the document by another branch . . . [but that this] alleged conflict 
that such an adjudication may cause cannot justify the courts’ avoiding their 
constitutional responsibility.”42 
The jurisprudence applying the political question doctrine to dismiss a 
case is overwhelmingly tied to a limited set of subjects: voting rights and 
political gerrymandering,43 issues involving treaties and the authority tied to 
treaty-making,44 issues involving war and associated strategies,45 and specific 
areas of foreign policy.46  This suggests that the scope is likewise meant to 
be limited, and poses interesting questions and difficult problems in the 
case of tort-based climate change litigation, for which there is little 
analogous case law.47 
C. The Second and Third Baker Factors
Of the six factors the Court identified in Baker as being tied to political 
questions, the second and third have been most commonly invoked in 
39. Id. at 492.
40. Id. at 513.
41. Id. at 520-21.
42. Id. at 549.
43. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (Vieth) (holding that political
gerrymandering cases are not justiciable). 
44. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (Goldwater) (holding that the
President’s power to terminate a treaty was non-justiciable in that instance); see also, 
Japan Whaling, 478 U.S. at 221 (holding that the Court could interpret treaties and 
executive agreements without political question bar). 
45. See Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that the
method of sharing war-making powers between the legislative and executive 
branches is non-justiciable). 
46. Erin C. Borissov, Global Warming: A Questionable Use of the Political
Question Doctrine, 41 IND. L. REV. 415, 439 (2008). 
47. Id. at 440, n.210 (stating that all domestic controversies in which the
United States Supreme Court has found a political question have involved an explicit 
constitutional issue.) 
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dismissals of tort-based climate change litigation as political questions.48  
As such, it is important to understand the progression of these specific Baker 
factors in jurisprudence.   
The second Baker factor precludes a court from adjudicating where 
there is a “lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards” for 
resolving the case before it.49  There is agreement among most scholars that 
the underlying requirement of this factor is to “construe the Constitution to 
discover the criteria for deciding the issue in question to determine whether 
‘the judicial tests through which constitutional norms are enforced’ are 
manageable.”50  The recent case of Vieth v. Jubelirer (Vieth) sheds some light on 
what may or may not be manageable. 
Vieth involved a claim of equal protection violations with respect to 
partisan gerrymandering.51  The Court unanimously found that the Equal 
Protection Clause forbids partisan gerrymandering that excessively 
disadvantages a political party, but was unable to agree on the standard that 
should be used to determine whether a particular gerrymander violates the 
Equal Protection Clause.52  Since there was no applicable standard in the 
Constitution or in case law, a plurality of the Court would have “declared 
equal protection challenges to political gerrymandering nonjusticiable on 
political question grounds.”53 
What this suggests is that the second Baker factor “does not mean that 
the difficulty lies so much in crafting a judicial remedy as in identifying what 
the law requires and whether those requirements have been met.”54  So long 
as there are standards for resolving the particular case in front of the court, 
i.e., a clear picture of the law at hand and what would constitute a violation
of it, the case should not be dismissed as a political question using the
48. See AEPC I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 272 (finding the third Baker factor
“particularly pertinent” to its discussion); Comer, 585 F.3d at 860 (citing to district 
court transcripts which indicate that the case was dismissed because adjudicating 
would require “an initial policy determination of a kind which is simply nonjudicial”); 
GMC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547 at 18 (stating that the third Baker factor “largely 
controls the analysis in the current case”); Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 876 (holding 
that the second and third Baker factors “preclude judicial consideration” of the 
claims). 
49. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
50. Breedon, supra note 8, at 537 (quoting in part Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Judicially Mangeable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274, 
1281 (2006)). 
51. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 267.
52. Id.; see also Breedon, supra note 8, at 537.
53. Breedon, supra note 8, at 534.
54. Id. at 535; see also Fallon, supra note 50, at 1281-97.
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second Baker factor.55  Regardless of what broader implications the idea 
behind a particular case ruling may have, the second Baker factor focuses on 
the actual claim at issue and whether the judicial branch is the most 
appropriate vehicle for resolution of the issue.56 
The third Baker factor precludes a court from adjudicating a case where 
it is impossible to decide the outcome “without an initial policy 
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.”57  Given the cases 
cited in Baker to develop the six factor test,58 it would appear that the third 
factor “means something other than a requirement that the political 
branches identify and assign weight to broad policy considerations relevant 
to the controversy” before determining entitlement to relief.59  The more 
appropriate basis for the third factor is an inquiry into “whether a particular 
and discrete diplomatic determination by a political branch about a party to, 
or fact in, the specific controversy . . . must be made before the court can 
decide the legal issues.”60 
The open-endedness of the third factor, however, easily lends itself to 
overbroad application.  Courts’ aversion to “regulation through litigation”61 
can result in their dismissal of cases that seem too politically charged, 
controversial, or complicated.62  Yet it is important to remember the 
following: First, courts may always be overridden by the political branches 
through legislation, thereby rectifying any judicial policy decision that is 
55. Id.; see also Breedon, supra note 8, at 538.
56. Breedon, supra note 8, at 538; see also Barasich v. Columbia Gulf Transmission
Co., 467 F. Supp. 2d 676, 684 (E.D. La. 2006) (noting that tort actions have clear 
standards rendering the second Baker factor inappropriate); Doe v. Exxon-Mobil, 473 
F.3d 345, 354-55 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (noting that tort actions are “constitutionally
committed to the judiciary”).
57. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
58. See Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. 635 (1850) (holding that courts cannot interpret
interests protected by a treaty until the executive branch first determines whether 
such a treaty is in effect); Ex parte Hitz, 111 U.S. 766 (1884) (holding that courts cannot 
recognize diplomatic privilege until the executive determines diplomatic status). 
59. Breedon, supra note 8, at 539.
60. Id.
61. Amelia Thorpe, Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation and the Political Question
Doctrine, 24 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. LAW 79, 88 (2008) (A concept that emerged as a result 
of the tobacco litigation of the 1990s, where some commentators saw tobacco suits 
as representing a “new, undesirable genre of litigation in which the courts are taking 
on broad policy problems best left to legislatures.”) (hereinafter Thorpe); see also W. 
Kip Viscusi, A Postmortem on the Cigarette Settlement, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 523 (1999) (detailed 
critique of “regulation through litigation” in the context of the tobacco litigation). 
62. Thorpe, supra note 61, at 88.
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disfavored by the other branches; second, since questions of bias and 
expertise can be raised against all members of all branches, not just the 
judiciary, it may in fact be beneficial to have all three branches involved in 
some policy-making; and third, judges do, in fact, make policy decisions on 
a daily basis.63   
III. The Political Question Doctrine and Tort-Based Climate
Change Litigation
Since 2005, the political question doctrine has emerged as a
significant hurdle for litigants to overcome with regard to climate change 
litigation.  Where once the doctrine proved a complete barrier, the recent 
decision by the Second Circuit suggests that the political question doctrine 
has in fact been misapplied to tort-based climate change litigation.64  This 
part of the Note will address the recent uses of the political question 
doctrine as a bar to climate change regulation at the district court level and 
subsequent analysis of the Second Circuit decision which reversed the lower 
court decision in AEPC I.   
D. The Connecticut v. American Electric Power Company
Litigation: Part I
In 2005, the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York in Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co. (“AEPC I”) dismissed a 
public nuisance suit on political question grounds.65  The suit, which was the 
first of its kind, was brought by a contingent of eight states and three public 
land trusts against six of the largest electric utility companies in the 
nation.66  The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief to abate the utility 
companies’ CO2 emissions, citing these emissions as significant 
contributions to global warming.67  Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that 
defendants’ emissions constituted 25 percent of the U.S. electric power 
sector’s CO2 emissions; that CO2 is the primary greenhouse gas responsible 
for global warming; and that because of the defendants’ significant 
contributions to global warming, irreparable harm will be done to property 
in New York state and the health, safety, and well-being of the citizens of the 
state is in jeopardy.68  The defendants moved to dismiss the claims for lack 
63. Id. at 89-90.
64. See AEPC II, 582 F.3d 309.
65. AEPC I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
66. Id. at 267.
67. Id. at 270.
68. Id. at 268.
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of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted.69 
In determining whether the case could be resolved without an initial 
policy determination of a nonjudicial nature, the district court focused 
primarily on the third Baker factor.70  If the case could not be resolved 
without an initial policy determination, it must be dismissed on political 
question grounds.  Citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC (Chevron),71 the district 
court held that balancing the plaintiffs’ interests in rapid pollution reduction 
with the economic and industrial importance of the electric power sector is 
“impossible without an ‘initial policy determination’ first having been made 
by the elected branches to which our system commits such policy decisions, 
viz., Congress and the President.”72  Hailing the “transcendently legislative 
nature”73 of the litigation, the court stated that the relief requested by 
plaintiffs would require them, at minimum, to: 
(1) Determine the appropriate level at which to cap the carbon
dioxide emissions of these Defendants; (2) determine the
appropriate percentage reduction to impose upon Defendants;
(3) create a schedule to implement those reductions; (4)
determine and balance the implications of such relief on the
United States’ ongoing negotiations with other nations
concerning global climate change; (5) assess and measure
available alternative energy resources; and (6) determine and
balance the implications of such relief on the United States’
energy sufficiency and thus its national security . . . .74 
The court then listed various policy determinations that would be 
required before any court could address these issues, including: economic 
implications, implications for energy independence and national security, 
and how the costs of such injunctive relief should be borne.75   
Finally, the court cited numerous statements of the Environmental 
Protection Agency (“EPA”) dealing with the issue of global warming, as well 
as “the explicit statements of Congress and the Executive on the issue of 
69. Id. at 267.
70. Id. at 272.
71. 467 U.S. 837, 847 (1984) (stating that, in air pollution cases, courts must
balance “interests seeking strict schemes to reduce pollution rapidly to eliminate its 
social costs and interests advancing the economic concern that strict schemes [will] 
retard industrial development with attendant social costs.”). 
72. AEPC I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 272.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 273.
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global climate change in general and their specific refusal to impose the 
limits on carbon dioxide emissions Plaintiffs now seek to impose by judicial 
fiat,” as confirmation that “addressing global climate change is an 
undertaking for the political branches.”76  The court then held that, “because 
resolution of the issues presented . . . require[d] identification and 
balancing of economic, environmental, foreign policy, and national security 
interests”, the third Baker factor applied and the case presented 
nonjusticiable political questions.77 
E. California and the Automobile Emissions Litigation
In 2007, the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
California relied heavily on AEPC I in dismissing California’s public nuisance 
claim for damages against automakers for creating and contributing to 
global warming.78  The plaintiff in California v. General Motors Corporation 
(“GMC”) claimed that defendants’ CO2 emissions constituted over 20 percent 
of the nation’s emissions, and over 30 percent of the CO2 emissions in 
California alone.79  Plaintiff sought damages for, inter alia, the reduction of 
the snow pack in the Sierra Nevada region, increased erosion along the 
coast, and the increased risk of flooding and wildfires, all under a theory of 
public nuisance and all related to defendants’ contributions to global 
warming.80  As in AEPC I, the defendants moved to dismiss, partly on 
political question grounds.81 
The court invoked the first, second and third Baker factors in 
dismissing the complaint on political question grounds, stating that the 
third factor was especially relevant and focusing on that analysis first.82  The 
court followed the reasoning in AEPC I in rejecting the plaintiff’s claim that 
there was enough well-established tort law for the court to use in making 
their decision, holding that a Chevron balancing test was impossible without 
an initial policy decision to be made by the elected branches.83  The court 
gave three specific reasons why it would be improper for the judicial branch 
76. Id. at 274.
77. Id.
78. GMC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547.
79. Id. at *3-4.
80. Id. at *4.
81. Id.
82. Id. at *17.
83. Id. at *20.
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to make such policy decisions.84  First, the court reasoned that balancing 
“the competing interests of reducing global warming emissions and the 
interests of advancing and preserving economic and industrial 
development”85 are determinations to be made by the political branches of 
the government.86  Second, citing the “prevalence of international and 
national debate, and the resulting policy actions and inactions” surrounding 
the concept of global warming,87 and the “broad array of domestic and 
international measures that are yet undefined,”88 the court stated that a 
decision allowing damages in this instance would be premature and 
inappropriate.89  Finally, citing to Massachusetts v. EPA,90 the court noted that 
“initial policy determinations [on the regulation of carbon dioxide] are made 
by the political branches while preserving a framework for judicial review of 
those determinations.”91 
The GMC court also found that the first and second Baker factors were 
implicated, though to a lesser degree.  In finding that the case failed the first 
Baker factor, a “textually demonstrable constitutional commitment to the 
political branches of government,”92 the court focused on what it saw as the 
potential implications of plaintiff’s claim on the political branches’ powers 
over domestic and foreign commerce and general foreign policy.93  The court 
held that, because imposing damages for public nuisance would affect 
defendants’ worldwide sale of automobiles and thus “have an inextricable 
effect on interstate commerce and foreign policy - issues constitutionally 
committed to the political branches of government,” the first Baker factor 
was applicable.94 
84. Id. at *20-38; see also Morgan McCue Sport, An Inconvenient Suit: California v.
General Motors Corporation and A Look at Whether Global Warming Constitutes An Actionable 
Public Nuisance or A Nonjusticiable Political Question, 38 CUMB. L. REV. 583, 625 (2007-08). 
85. Id. at *24.
86. Id.
87. Id. at *29.
88. Id. at *30.
89. Id.
90. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
91. GMC, 2007 LEXIS 68547 at *33-34 (citing  Massachusetts v EPA, 549 U.S. 497
(2007), holding that states have surrendered to the federal government their right to 
engage in certain types of regulation, i.e., regulation of CO
2
). 
92. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
93. GMC, 2007 LEXIS 68547 at *41.
94. Id. at *43.
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In finding that the case failed the second Baker test, a “lack of judicially 
manageable standards” for resolving the case,95 the court distinguished prior 
public nuisance cases cited by the plaintiff on the ground that they failed to 
“implicate a comparable number of national and international policy issues” 
as are present in the case of global warming.96  The court claimed that 
because there was no well-established “legal framework for assessing global 
warming nuisance damages,” it was left without appropriate standards for 
determining what reasonable levels of CO2 emissions might be and who 
should bear the costs of a problem that has an infinite number of sources on 
a global scale.97 
F. The Comer v. Murphy Oil U.S.A. Litigation
The next tort-based climate change case, Comer v. Murphy Oil, U.S.A. 
(Comer I), was decided in 2007 by the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Mississippi.98  Plaintiffs were members of a class action 
suit, encompassing various residents and owners of property along the 
Mississippi coastline that had been damaged or destroyed by Hurricane 
Katrina.99  Plaintiffs claimed that the defendant energy, fossil fuel, and 
chemical corporations’ emissions of greenhouse gases contributed to global 
warming, which in turn increased the power of weather systems such as 
hurricanes that led to the destruction of their property.100  Plaintiffs sought 
both compensatory and punitive damages based on, inter alia, common-law 
private and public nuisance claims.101   
Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims on both standing and 
political question grounds, and the court granted the motion.102  In a ruling 
from the bench, the district court stated that plaintiffs’ complaint required 
the court to “balance economic, environmental, foreign policy, and national 
security interests and make an initial policy determination of a kind which is 
simply nonjudicial.”103  Furthermore, the court held that adjudication of the 
case would require developing standards that should be left to the political 
branches of government, such as “the amount of greenhouse gas emissions 
95. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
96. GMC, 2007 LEXIS 68547 at *46.
97. Id.
98. Comer I, No. 1:05-CV-436-LG-RHW (S.D. Miss. Aug 30, 2007).
99. Comer v. Murphy Oil, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009) (Comer II), vacated on
unrelated grounds, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010). 
100. Id. at 859.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 860.
103. Comer I, No. 1:05-CV-436-LG-RHW (S.D. Miss. Aug 30, 2007).
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that would be excessive and the scientific and policy reasons behind those 
standards.”104  As such, the district court dismissed the case.105 
G. American Electric Power Company: The Second Circuit
Weighs In
In September of 2009, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit reversed the district court in AEPC I and held, among other 
things, that plaintiffs’ actions did not present a nonjusticiable political 
question.106  The court began by tracing the history of the political question 
doctrine and noting that the Supreme Court has rarely in its history found 
the political question to be a bar on adjudication.107  The court then took a 
step-by-step approach, analyzing each Baker factor and finding them 
inapplicable to the case.108 
In addressing the first Baker factor, the court first noted that the 
defendants argued that the issues at hand were committed to the political 
branches through the Commerce Clause as a matter of “high policy.”109  The 
court considered this argument waived at the outset, however, because the 
defendants had failed to explain their connection of the emissions issue and 
the Commerce Clause.110  Next, the court addressed the defendants’ 
arguments that permitting the plaintiffs’ claims to be adjudicated would 
interfere with the executive authority over foreign relations and the ability to 
resolve fundamental policy questions via diplomatic or other means.111  The 
court disagreed with the defendants’ framing of the issue at hand, reasoning 
that characterizing the lawsuit “as implicating ‘complex, inter-related and 
104. Id.
105. In October of 2009, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district
court decision in Comer I and held that the case did not present nonjusticiable 
political questions.  See Comer II, 585 F.3d at 879.  In early 2010, the Fifth Circuit 
granted a rehearing en banc, which vacated the Comer II decision.  See Comer v. Murphy 
Oil, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010).  However, “[a]fter the en banc court was properly 
constituted, new circumstances arose that caused disqualification and recusal of one 
of the nine judges, leaving only eight judges on a court of sixteen judges who [were] 
not disqualified.”  Comer v. Murphy Oil, 607 F.3d 1049, 1053-54 (5th Cir. 2010).  The 
court, unable to form a quorum, then ordered the clerk to dismiss the appeal without 
ever having reached the merits.  Id. 
106. AEPC II, 582 F.3d 309.
107. Id. at 321 (quoting Barkow, supra note 20).
108. Id. at 324-332.
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far-reaching policy questions about the causes of global climate change and 
the most appropriate response to it’ magnifies to the outer extent the 
discrete domestic nuisance issues actually presented.”112  The court pointed 
out that the plaintiffs in this case had never asked for a broad solution to 
global warming; rather, the plaintiffs were asking for emissions limits on the 
particular domestic power plants which had allegedly caused them harm 
and created a public nuisance.113  As the court noted in finding no basis for 
the application of the first Baker factor: 
A decision by a single federal court concerning a common law of 
nuisance cause of action, brought by domestic plaintiffs against 
domestic companies for domestic conduct, does not establish a 
national or international emissions policy . . . [and thus] invocation 
of the political question doctrine here is unwarranted because 
the relief for which Plaintiffs pray applies in only the most 
tangential and attenuated way to the expansive domestic and 
foreign policy issues raised by Defendants.114 
In addressing the second Baker factor, the court rejected defendants’ 
argument that the complexities involved in global warming and pollution 
regulation, coupled with the “vague and indeterminate nuisance concepts 
and maxims of equity gleaned from public nuisance cases or the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts,”115 precluded adjudication of plaintiffs’ 
claims for lack of judicially manageable standards.  Citing to a number of 
complex public nuisance cases that were novel at the time of adjudication,116 
the court noted that these were just the first “in a long line of federal 
common law nuisance cases where federal courts employed familiar public 
nuisance precepts, grappled with scientific evidence, and resolved the issues 
presented . . . .”117  The mere fact that a case is complex, novel, or otherwise 
politically charged does not automatically mean that there are no judicially 
manageable standards for resolving it; instead, “[f]ederal courts have long 
been up to the task of assessing complex scientific evidence in cases where 
112. Id. at 325.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 326.
116. See Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901) (Missouri I) (public nuisance case
involving sewage discharge into the Mississippi River); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 
(1906) (Missouri II) (following Missouri I, the Court “carefully appraised the 
sophisticated scientific and expert evidence offered” in coming to a decision). 
117. AEPC II, 582 F.3d at 327.
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the cause of action was based either upon the federal common law or upon 
a statute.”118   
Additionally, the court noted that adjudicating plaintiffs’ claims in this 
case would “[n]ot involve assessing and balancing the kind of broad 
interests that a legislature or a President might consider in formulating a 
national emissions policy,” as suggested by the district court in AEPC I.  
Rather, adjudication of the claim would require the district court to simply 
“address and resolve the particular nuisance issue before it.”119  Given the 
fact that there were judicially recognized standards for resolving the case 
under established nuisance law, defendants were not entitled to dismissal 
under the second Baker factor.120 
As noted in the discussion of AEPC I, the district court relied mainly 
on the third Baker factor in dismissing the case.  In particular, the district 
court relied on the fact that the political branches had failed to develop a 
concrete policy regarding global warming, viewing “the possibility of any 
regulation coming out of the courts as countering the political branches’ 
refusal to act.”121  The circuit court disagreed, noting that the Supreme Court 
has stated that a “mere refusal to legislate . . . falls far short of an expression 
of legislative intent to supplant the existing common law in [an] area,”122 and 
as such plaintiffs “need not await an ‘initial policy determination’ in order to 
proceed on . . . a federal common law of nuisance claim, as such claims have 
been adjudicated in the federal courts for over a century.”123  Again pointing 
to the fact that, at its most basic level, the case involved ordinary tort 
claims, the court held that there could be no violation of the third Baker 
factor.124 
Finally, the court addressed the fourth, fifth, and sixth Baker factors 
together in holding that no political question was present.125  The court 
noted that these factors “appear to be relevant only if judicial resolution of a 
question would contradict prior decisions taken by a political branch in 
those limited contexts where such contradiction would seriously interfere 
with important governmental interests.”126  The court held that “[a]llowing 
this litigation where there is a lack of a unified policy does not demonstrate 
any lack of respect for the political branches, contravene a relevant political 
118. Id. at 329.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 330.
121. Id. (citing AEPC I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 273-74).
122. Id. (quoting United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 535 (1993)).
123. AEPC II, 582 F.3d at 331.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. (quoting Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 249 (2nd Cir. 1995)).
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decision already made, or result in multifarious pronouncements that would 
embarrass the nation.”127  As such, and noting that Congress has the power 
to displace common law standards through its own legislation which the 
courts would then have to follow, the court held that the district court erred 
in dismissing plaintiffs’ complaints on political question grounds.128 
IV. Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil and What
Happens Next
In September 2009, immediately after AEPC II was decided, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California issued its 
decision in Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil (Kivalina),129 dismissing the 
case partly on political question grounds.  Plaintiffs appealed the ruling to 
the Ninth Circuit on November 5, 2009. 
A. Facts of Kivalina
The Native Village of Kivalina is the governing body of an Alaskan 
Inupiat Eskimo village, Kivalina, home to approximately 400 residents.130  
The coast of Kivalina is “protected by Arctic sea ice [in the] fall, winter and 
spring . . . which acts as a barrier against coastal storms and waves that 
affect the coast of the Chukchi Sea.”131  As a result of global warming, this ice 
protection arrives later in the year and thins out earlier, subjecting Kivalina 
to storms and waves that have had the effect of degrading the village over 
time.132  As a result of the dissipation of the ice protection and subsequent 
destruction of Kivalina’s land, the village is becoming uninhabitable and 
“Plaintiffs allege[d] that as a result, the Village will have to be relocated at a 
cost estimated to range from $95 to $400 million.”133   
The plaintiffs filed suit against 24 oil, energy and utility companies, 
seeking damages “under a federal common law claim of nuisance, based on 
their alleged contribution to the excessive emission of carbon dioxide and 
127. Id. at 332 (citing Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 558 (9th Cir. 2005)
(“Because of a lack of a policy decision on point, we do not reach the question posed 
by the fifth Baker test whether there is an unusual need for unquestioning adherence 
thereto.”); Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione, etc., 937 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 
1991) (“[N]o prior political decisions are questioned - or even implicated - by the 
matter before us.”). 
128. Id.
129. Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 863.
130. Id. at 868.
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other greenhouse gases which they claim are causing global warming.”134  
The defendants moved to dismiss, contending that the plaintiffs’ claims 
presented nonjusticiable political questions, and further that the plaintiffs 
lacked standing.135 
B. The District Court’s Reasoning
The district court began by addressing the first Baker factor.136  The 
defendants argued that because Congress and the President had previously 
refused to adopt emissions regulations without concessions made by 
foreign countries, “allowing Plaintiffs to proceed with their global warming 
claim would run afoul of the first Baker factor ‘because it would intrude upon 
the political branches’ constitutionally committed authority over foreign 
policy.’”137  Noting that the defendants had shown that global warming and 
its related issues “may implicate foreign policy and related economic 
issues”, the court stated that nevertheless “[t]he indisputably international 
dimension of this particular environmental problem does not render the 
instant controversy a non-justiciable one.”138  Further, the court noted that 
the defendants had failed to cite any specific provision of federal law or the 
Constitution which vests the final determination regarding climate change, 
global warming, or emissions regulations in either of the two political 
branches.139  As such, the court found the first Baker factor inapplicable.140 
The court combined the second and third Baker factors under the 
general inquiry of whether “resolution of the question demand[s] that a 
court move beyond areas of judicial expertise.”141   
With regard to the second Baker factor, the plaintiffs contended that 
because this was, at the most basic level, a public nuisance case, there are 
significant standards available to the court in determining whether the 
defendants contributed to an unreasonable interference with the rights of 
the public.142  This is the same line of reasoning put forward by the Second 
Circuit in AEPC II.  Here, however, the court stated that the plaintiffs 
134. Id.
135. Id. at 870 (This Note will not reach the question of standing, however the
court did find a lack of standing and dismissed the case on that ground as well.). 
136. Id. at 872.
137. Id. at 872-73.
138. Id. at 873 (citing Corrie v. Caterpillar, 503 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007)).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. (citing Wang v. Masaitis, 416 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2005)).
142. Id. at 874.
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overlooked that “whether the interference is unreasonable turns on weighing 
‘the gravity of the harm against the utility of the conduct.’”143 
Citing to GMC, the district court stated that it would be required to 
weigh “the energy-producing alternatives that were available in the past and 
consider their respective impact on far ranging issues such as their 
reliability as an energy source, safety considerations and the impact of the 
different alternative on consumers and business at every level.”144  From this, 
the court stated that the finder of fact would then have to “weigh the 
benefits derived from those choices against the risk that increasing 
greenhouse gases would in turn increase the risk of causing flooding along 
the coast of a remote Alaskan locale,” a task for which there are no particular 
judicially discoverable and manageable standards.145 
The court then addressed the plaintiffs’ argument that the existence of 
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for their claims is evident 
in the long history of air and water pollution cases.146  First, the court 
acknowledged the AEPC II decision and its reliance on this same argument, 
briefly summarizing the decision.147  The court went on, however, to 
distinguish the factual arguments in AEPC II from the Kivalina litigation and 
critique the reasoning of the Second Circuit’s decision.148  The court 
dismissed the cases cited by AEPC II and the plaintiffs, noting that the 
“common thread running through each of those cases is that they involved a 
discrete number of ‘polluters’ that were identified as causing a specific 
injury to a specific area,” whereas here the public nuisance claim is “based 
on the emission of greenhouses gases located throughout the world and 
affecting the entire planet and its atmosphere.”149  The court also distinguished the 
water pollution cases on the grounds that in those cases, the discharge itself 
is the harm, whereas in global warming the harm derives from a series of 
events disconnected from the actual discharge.150  
Furthermore, in holding that the second Baker factor precluded 
adjudication of the plaintiffs’ claims, the court stated that no cases could 
provide any guidance on global warming nuisance, which “seeks to impose 
liability and damages on a scale unlike any prior environmental pollution 
143. Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821(b)(1) (1979)).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 874-75.




150. Id. at 876.
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cases,” that would assist the court in reaching a resolution of the case in a 
reasoned manner.151 
Finally, the court addressed the third Baker factor and held that it also 
precluded the plaintiffs’ claims from moving forward.  The court noted two 
policy determinations that the plaintiffs’ claims required before the case 
could be decided: First, what would have been an acceptable level of 
emissions by the defendants; and second, who should bear the coast of 
global warming, considering everyone on the planet is to blame.152  The court 
rejected the plaintiffs’ assertion that, because they are seeking damages 
rather than injunctive relief, there is no need for the court to determine what 
emissions standards should have been imposed.153  As the court noted, 
“[r]egardless of the relief sought, the resolution of Plaintiffs’ nuisance claim 
requires balancing the social utility of Defendants’ conduct with the harm it 
inflicts”, a determination that cannot be made without the above policy 
determinations being laid out first.154  As a result, the court dismissed the 
plaintiffs’ claims as invoking both the second and third Baker factors.155 
C. The Appeal
In their opening brief to the Ninth Circuit, Kivalina stresses that 
“[a]djudication of [the] case will not require the judiciary to engage in 
legislative or executive functions . . . [but instead] will require the judiciary 
to perform its core Article III role of resolving a current and real controversy 
between the parties, apply common-law doctrines and determine an 
appropriate damages award.”156  Following the reasoning of AEPC II, the 
appeal attempts to focus the court’s attention toward this particular claim 
and the historical ability of the judiciary to resolve public nuisance claims. 
It is the Native Village of Kivalina at issue - not international environmental 
policy, and Kivalina attacks the legal reasoning and substantive policy 
decisions made by the district court in their opening papers.   
Kivalina argues that “[t]he district court’s decision that [the case] 
lacked judicially discoverable and manageable standards rested on two 
errors: first, a legal error regarding the elements of a public nuisance claim, 




154. Id. at 877.
155. Id. at 876-77.
156. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 40, Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil
Corp., No. 09-17490 (9th Cir. Mar. 10, 2010). 
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pollution cases.”157  The legal error, according to Kivalina, was the district 
court’s assertion that a utility/benefit balancing process was the central 
question in a nuisance suit for damages.158  As Kivalina states, “the central 
question in a nuisance action for damages is not one of balancing but rather 
one of allocation: a court asks which party should bear the cost of the harm 
that an interference has caused.”159  Kivalina then goes on to argue that the 
district court improperly distinguished “prior public nuisance law as 
allegedly involving a ‘discrete number of polluters that were identified as 
causing a specific injury to a specific area.’”160  Here, “Kivalina is suffering 
from a specific injury in a specific area - its annihilation from the very 
specific location that is being wiped from the map by global warming.”161  As 
Kivalina notes, the fact that there is a worldwide injury as a result of global 
warming does not diminish the fact that Kivalina itself is asserting a specific 
injury against a discrete set of polluters.162  Thus, according to Kivalina, the 
district court improperly applied the law of nuisance and ineffectually 
distinguished prior nuisance cases in determining that there were no 
judicially manageable standards for resolving the case.163 
Kivalina then goes on to argue that the district court erred in applying 
Baker factor three - where adjudication of a case would require an initial 
policy decision best left to the political branches.164  If a policy decision 
would be required, the political branches have already done so by making it 
official U.S. policy that greenhouse gas emissions should be reduced.165  
Furthermore, decisions regarding who should pay for global warming 
injuries are judicial functions, and as such the district court erred in holding 
that those decisions would require political policy determinations.166  And, 
finally, Kivalina notes that holding only some polluters liable and the 
decision surrounding which ones to choose are not political policy 
determinations, but rather “not an uncommon judicial function to hold a 
subset of multiple polluters liable where pollution is widespread.”167  For the 
157. Id. at 49.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 55.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 49.
164. Id. at 58.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 60.
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reasons stated above, Kivalina argues that the district court erred in 
dismissing the case on political question grounds. 
D. Looking Forward
How the Ninth Circuit will handle the appeal is very much a question 
of interpretation.  Since GMC was never appealed, the Ninth Circuit never 
had the opportunity to weigh in on the political question aspect of the case. 
And although GMC was heavily criticized by the Second Circuit in AEPC II, 
the Kivalina court relied on it in dismissing the case.  The question is 
whether the Ninth Circuit will join the Second Circuit in reversing the district 
court in Kivalina, or whether it will create a circuit split to eventually be 
rectified by the United States Supreme Court.168 
The short amount of time that passed between the AEPC II and Kivalina 
decisions suggests that the Kivalina district court did not give enough 
consideration to the Second Circuit’s persuasive legal reasoning in AEPC II.  
At the time it came down, the AEPC II ruling was considered a sudden, 
outlying decision in the field of global climate change litigation, and that in 
some ways posed a barrier to the Kivalina litigation.169  The Kivalina court was 
quick to dismiss Second Circuit’s reasoning as “sanguine,” and to note that 
the AEPC II decision stood against a background of case law invoking the 
political question doctrine in the “climate change as public nuisance” 
context.170  Despite this, the Ninth Circuit now has the opportunity to give 
greater weight to the reasoning of its sister circuit in finding that the 
background of case law favors reversing the Northern District Court decision.  
The Ninth Circuit has never addressed the political question doctrine 
in this context before.  The district court in Kivalina relied heavily on Corrie v. 
Caterpillar,171 a fairly recent Ninth Circuit decision dismissing a case on 
political question grounds.  Corrie, however, is distinguishable from Kivalina 
on the facts, and therefore will likely not pose as a barrier to plaintiffs on 
appeal.  In Corrie, an action was brought against bulldozer manufacturers by 
family members of individuals whom had been killed or injured by 
bulldozers, which had been paid for and supplied by the United States and 
were used by Israeli Defense Forces to destroy homes in Palestine.172  The 
court held that: 
168. Jennifer Koons, ‘Climate: Courts follow landmark 2nd Circuit ruling with 2
GHG decisions.’  Environment and Energy, October 19, 2009. 
169. Jesse Greenspan, ‘Kivalina Case Dismissal Breaks with 2nd Circ.’, Law 360:
The Newswire for Business Lawyers (available at http://www.law360.com/articles/128820). 
170. Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 875.
171. 503 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007).
172. Id. at 977.
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Allowing this action to proceed would necessarily require the 
judicial branch of our government to question the political 
branches’ decision to grant extensive military aid to Israel.  It is 
difficult to see how we could impose liability [on the bulldozer 
manufacturer] without at least implicitly deciding the propriety of 
the United States’ decision to pay for the bulldozers which 
allegedly killed the plaintiffs’ family members.173 
The case explicitly called into question definitive acts by the United 
States government in helping a foreign nation, and additionally the policy 
surrounding those acts.  As such, Corrie is distinguishable from Kivalina and 
the related global warming cases, which rely on inaction by the political 
branches and only have an incidental connection to foreign policy. 
V. Conclusion
No matter how the Ninth Circuit rules on Kivalina, it remains clear that
the decision will be highly influential in the environmental law community 
and the general field of climate change analysis.  If the Ninth Circuit reverses 
the district court’s decision and follows the Second Circuit, there will be 
significant legal consensus that public nuisance claims relating to climate 
change do not pose nonjusticiable political questions.  The potential impact 
of that holding and subsequent consensus could spur Congress to action in 
an effort to shape the regulatory schematics under which these claims could 
be adjudicated.  On the other hand, if the Ninth Circuit diverts from the 
Second Circuit and upholds the district court’s dismissal, “it would 
represent a major judicial schism over the largest environmental issue of 
this century, and put pressure on the United States Supreme Court to mend 
the rift.”174 
173. Id. at 982.
174. William Enger, et al., ‘Global Warming Litigation: Native Village of
Kivalina,’ Martindale.com (available at http://www.martindale.com/litigation-
law/article_Wilson-Elser-Moskowitz-Edelman-Dicker_913360.htm). 
